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Abstract
There is a presumption that fixed and flexible (floating or market-determined)
exchange-rate systems are equivalent if prices are flexible. We show that the
presumption does not hold in two matching models of money. In both models,
(i) currencies are the only assets and all trade is spot trade; (ii) the trades
that directly determine welfare occur in pairwise meetings between buyers and
sellers; and (iii) imperfect substitutability (including, as a special case, no sub-
stitutability) among currencies is a consequence of the trading protocol in those
meetings. The two models are variants of the Lagos-Wright (2005) model and
differ regarding the timing of the shock realizations relative to the centralized
trade opportunities. One version has a speculative fringe. In it, the unique
stationary (monetary) equilibrium under the fixed exchange-rate regime is one
of a continuum of equilibria under a flexible exchange-rate regime. The other
version has no speculative fringe. In it, there is a unique (monetary) stationary
equilibrium under each exchange-rate regime and they differ.
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1 Introduction
There is a presumption that fixed and flexible (floating or market-determined)
exchange-rate systems are equivalent if prices are flexible. Friedman’s influential
essay, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, rests entirely on the assumption that
domestic prices are sticky, while exchange rates are not (see [2]). A similar view is the
foundation of the literature on optimum currency areas (see Mundell [11]). A formal
statement of equivalence under flexible prices is in Lucas [8]. Implicit in Friedman
and Mundell and explicit in Lucas is a classical-dichotomy, flexible-price model in
which the quantities of currencies and their rates of return do not affect anything
real and in which, less significantly, any kind of currency substitution is ruled out.
Here, in contrast, (i) currencies are the only assets and all trade is spot trade; (ii)
the trades that directly determine welfare occur in pairwise meetings between buyers
and sellers; and (iii) following Zhu and Wallace (ZW) [14], imperfect substitutability
(including, as a special case, no substitutability) among currencies is a consequence of
the trading protocol in those meetings. We show that fixed and flexible exchange-rate
regimes are not equivalent in our models.
The two models are variants of Lagos-Wright (LW) [7]. They differ regarding the
timing of the shock realizations relative to the centralized trade opportunities. In one
variant, the no-speculative-fringe version, the timing is such that the only holders of
money are consumers who plan to spend all their money holdings. In it, there is a
unique (monetary) stationary equilibrium under each exchange-rate regime and they
differ. In the other version, half of all money holdings are held by producers, who will
not be spending their money holdings immediately. Their holdings constitute a large
speculative fringe and its existence implies that the unique stationary equilibrium
under the fixed exchange-rate regime is one of a continuum of equilibria under a
flexible exchange-rate regime.
As will be demonstrated, the assumption that the decentralized stage in both
models has pairwise meetings serves only one purpose. It allows us to reconcile
imperfect substitution between the two monies in the decentralized stage with the
requirement that trade be in the core in the meetings between buyers and sellers.
If, instead, that decentralized stage is replaced by a second centralized stage (by,
in effect, unlimited replication of the buyer-seller pairs in meetings) and if country-
specific cash-in-advance constraints are imposed in that stage—constraints which are
not consistent with trade being in the core—then the same results hold.1 There is,
though, one special case of the no-speculative-fringe version under centralized trade
and country-specific cash-in-advance constraints that does imply equivalence; namely,
when the model is converted into an endowment economy. In that case, the model
becomes a classical-dichotomy model.
So far as we know, there is no precursor of our results for the no-speculative-fringe
1Under replication, the core converges to competitive equilibrium. That implies that the two
monies must be perfect substitutes at the terms of trade given by their prices in the next market.
version—perhaps, because of the dominance of classical-dichotomy formulations in
open-economy monetary models. A precursor of our results for the speculative-fringe
version is King et. al. [6], who obtain a similar result, but with a different basis for
imperfect substitution between the two monies. In focusing on trade in two-person
meetings, our work bears some resemblance to earlier efforts to study the role of
multiple monies in such models—in particular, Matsuyama et. al. [9]. However, that
work and some follow-up work used models with indivisible money—individual money
holdings in the set {0, 1}. In such settings, it is awkward to model a foreign-exchange
market and there is a troublesome dependence of real outcomes on the exogenous
quantities of monies.
We start by setting out the structures of both versions of LW. Then we analyze
each version; we prove existence of equilibrium and the above nonequivalence claims.
Then we study a simple example for which we obtain closed-form solutions for equi-
libria. Finally, we discuss the consequences of abandoning the matching structure
with centralized trade under country-specific cash-in-advance constraints.
2 The models
We start by describing the no-speculative-fringe version. After describing it, the
speculative-fringe version can be described easily as a variant of it.
There are two symmetric countries, each populated by a nonatomic unit measure
of people. Each country has its own divisible money. There are two stages at each dis-
crete date. Stage 1 has a centralized market for everyone, residents of both countries,
where the objects traded are the two currencies and the single stage-1 good, a good
that is perishable and gives additively separable linear period utility. Stage 2 has
random pairwise meetings between producers and consumers in each of the two coun-
tries. Producers produce only in their home country; some consumers, the tourists,
visit the foreign country for consumption and then return home. Real international
trade consists solely of tourism.
At the start of stage 1, prior to stage-1 trade, each person has a portfolio of
amounts of the two monies and sees the realization of three preference shocks: two
idiosyncratic shocks and one aggregate shock. The first idiosyncratic shock determines
whether the person will be a producer or a consumer of the stage-2 perishable good.
With probability one-half, the person becomes a consumer and, otherwise, becomes
a producer. Producers stay in their home countries; a producer at stage 2 who
produces y amount of the stage-2 good experiences disutility c(y). The function c is
strictly increasing, convex, twice differentiable, and satisfies c(0) = 0. The second
idiosyncratic shock determines where a consumer consumes at the next stage 2. In
each country, a constant fraction become tourists for one date and will consume in
the other country at the next stage-2. The fraction is the same for both countries and
its magnitude does not matter. The utility for a consumer who consumes y at stage-2
is θu(y), where θ is the aggregate preference shock which is described below. The
function u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable, and satisfies
3
u(0) = 0. Later, we let U(·) ≡ u(c−1(·)) and assume that βU ′(0) > 2− β.
The aggregate shock θ depends on where stage-2 consumption will occur and
follows an I-state Markov chain. We denote by θi = (θ
1
i , θ
2
i ) a state in the chain,
i ∈ {1, ..., I}, where θki is the preference shock for those who will consume in country-
k, both tourists who visit country-k and non-tourist residents of country-k. We denote
by πij the transition probability from state θi to state θj, i, j ∈ {1, ..., I}. The Markov
chain is symmetric in that there exists a bijection i 7→ σ(i) on {1, ..., I} such that
(θ1σ(i), θ
2
σ(i)) = (θ
2
i , θ
1
i ) for all i and πij = πσ(i)σ(j) > 0 for all i, j.
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We assume that (θ1i , θ
2
i ) is in an ǫ-neighborhood of (1, 1) for all i. This small-
shock assumption is used in the existence proofs below to insure that the expected
rate of return on either money in any state does not exceed 1/β, a necessary condition
for equilibrium in this model. We need something like this because the equilibrium
conditions are I non-linear simultaneous equations under fixed exchange rates and
2I non-linear simultaneous equations under flexible exchange rates. Each proof of
existence of an equilibrium applies the implicit function theorem and rests on some
mild additional regularity conditions. Those conditions are stated in the respective
proofs, all of which appear in the appendix.
To summarize, the realized period utility in a period of a person who becomes
a consumer and who consumes x amount of the stage-1 good and y amount of the
stage-2 good is x + θu(y), while that of a person who becomes a producer and who
consumes x amount of the stage-1 good and produces y of the stage-2 good is x−c(y),
where y ≥ 0. (We interpret x < 0 as production.)
As hinted at above, a crucial aspect of our model depends on how stage-2 trade
in a meeting between a producer and consumer is modeled. We want the trade to
satisfy three conditions: it is in the pairwise core in meetings, both monies are valued,
the two monies are not perfect substitutes. One way to accomplish that is to have
the trade in a stage-2 meeting be the trade that maximizes the Nash product with a
larger weight on the consumer the larger is the share of the payment that is in the
form of the producer’s home money. A simpler way, which we adopt, is to use the
scheme in ZW: the favored asset is money of the producer’s home country and the
trade in a meeting is the result of the following two-step protocol: first, the buyer
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer subject to the offer consisting solely of the favored
asset; then, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer for any remaining assets that
the buyer may hold. As demonstrated in ZW, this produces a trade that is in the
pairwise core for the buyer-seller meeting.
The speculative-fringe version is identical except for the specification of stage 1
and the timing of the realization of the shocks. In it, stage 1 has two substages. Before
any shock realizations, there is a centralized market in which the objects traded are
the two monies and the linear good. Then, all the shocks are realized and there is a
2A simple example that satisfies all our assumptions has two equally likely states with θ1 =
(θ−, θ+) and θ2 = (θ+, θ−), where θ− ≤ 1 ≤ θ+ and (θ− + θ+)/2 = 1. This is the example studied
in section 5.
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centralized market in which only the two monies are traded. Although this version
may seem contrived, it is designed to have a speculative fringe, while maintaining the
LW property that the distribution of money holdings at the end of a date is not a state
variable of the model. A model with the timing of the no-speculative fringe version
but in which stage 1 is limited to trade only between the two monies would have the
same kind of speculative fringe. In it, however, the state of the economy entering
stage-1 would be the distribution of money holdings at the end of the previous period
and the current aggregate shock.3
Stage-1 trade in both versions of the model is price-taking trade and the exchange
rate is either flexible or fixed. When it is flexible, the quantity of each money is
fixed and constant and the stage-1 market has to clear, meaning that the exogenous
quantities of both monies are held in equilibrium at the end of stage 1 (or at the end of
each substage of stage 1). When the exchange rate is fixed, each country participates
at stage 1 by supplying unlimited amounts of its own money at the fixed exchange
rate which is constant. Such intervention, which is the standard way of modeling
a fixed exchange-rate regime, does not affect the total quantity of money and that
total must be held in equilibrium. Of course, the model under fixed exchange rates
is equivalent to the same model with a single money.
3 The no-speculative-fringe version
We start by defining a stationary equilibrium under each exchange-rate regime and
establishing existence and uniqueness. Then we prove that the equilibria differ.
3.1 Equilibrium
In order to define equilibrium, let m = (m1,m2) ∈ R
2
+ be an individual portfolio,
where ml is the amount of country-l money. Let φi = (φ
1
i , φ
2
i ) be the price vector of
monies in terms of the stage-1 good and let vi(m) be the value for a person of ending
stage 2 of the period with portfolio m. Using a well-known feature of linear utility
of the stage-1 good, we can express m 7→ vi(m) as an affine function of the expected
value of the portfolio m at the next stage 1. Limiting consideration to stationary
equilibria in which the current stage-1 price of each money depends at most on the
current realization of the aggregate shock, it follows that
vi(m) = β(A+
I∑
j=1
πijφjm), (1)
where A is a constant and φjm is the inner product of the vectors φj and m.
3See Molico [10] and Zhu [12] and [13] for the study of such models without any stage-1 and
without any aggregate shock. ZW describe and analyze settings with both stages, where stage 1 is
restricted to asset trade. However, none of these have aggregate shocks.
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Consider a consumer with m who consumes in country k at stage 2. The trade
between that consumer and a producer residing in country k holding m′ is determined
by the following problem that is adapted from ZW.
Problem 1 Let y ≥ 0 (output), d = (d1, d2) ∈ [0,m1] × [0,m2] (payment), and
φ¯i =
∑
j πijφj. First, let
(y˜, d˜) = argmax
(y,d)
[θki u(y)− βφ¯id], (2)
subject to −y + βφ¯id ≥ 0, dk ∈ [0,mk], and d-k = 0; next, let
(yki (m), d
k
i (m)) = argmax
(y,d)
[−c(y) + βφ¯id] (3)
subject to θki u(y)− βφ¯id ≥ θ
k
i u(y˜)− βφ¯id˜.
At stage 1, a consumer who consumes in country k at stage 2 chooses
mki = arg max
m≥(0,0)
[−φim+ θ
k
i u(y
k
i (m)) + vi(m− d
k
i (m))]. (4)
As noted above, existence of an equilibrium requires that following any realization of
the aggregate state, any asset has a gross expected return that does not exceed 1/β.
Given this, it is without loss of generality to assume that producers choose m = (0, 0)
in the stage-1 market, a condition we impose as part of the definition of equilibrium.
(It also follows that consumers specialize in the favored money, but we do not build
that conclusion into the definition of equilibrium.) Therefore, the market-clearing
condition is
2∑
k=1
mki = (1, 1) (5)
under flexible exchange rates and is
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
mkil = 2, (6)
under fixed rates. Here, we normalize the quantity of each money to be unity per
consumer per country-of-residence and in (6), we normalize the fixed exchange rate
to be unity.
Definition 1 A positive price vector φ = {φi}
I
i=1 with maxi,j(φ
k
i /φ
k
j ) < 1/β, k ∈
{1, 2}, is a stationary flexible exchange-rate equilibrium if (5) holds for all i and is a
stationary fixed exchange-rate equilibrium if φ1i = φ
2
i and (6) hold for all i.
In order to establish existence of an equilibrium, we describe a stationary equi-
librium by a system of equations in φ.4 In order to show that this system has a
solution when ǫ is sufficiently close to zero, we use the implicit function theorem and
the knowledge that the system has a solution when ǫ = 0.
4Readers who want to see both equilibria for a simple example should turn to section 5.
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In order to describe the system of equations, we let φ be such that maxi,j(φ
k
i /φ
k
j ) <
1/β. Then, it is optimal for a producer to leave stage 1 with m = (0, 0) and for a
consumer who consumes in country k at stage 2 to leave stage 1 only with country-k
money.5 Therefore, the consumer’s problem in (4) can be simplified to
mkik = argmax
mk
[θki U(βφ¯
k
imk)− φ
k
imk]. (7)
Under flexible exchange-rates, it follows from (7) and the stage-1 market-clearing
condition (5) that
F ki (φ, ǫ) ≡ βφ¯
k
i θ
k
i U
′(βφ¯ki )− φ
k
i = 0. (8)
When ǫ = 0, the system of equations F ki (φ, ǫ) = 0, has a unique solution,
φ(0) = ((η, η), ..., (η, η)) ∈ R2I ,
where η satisfies
βU ′(βη) = 1.
Under fixed rates, it follows from (7) that φki = βφ¯
k
i θ
k
i v
′(βφ¯kim
k
ik). Letting W be the
inverse of U ′, we have
mkik =
1
βφ¯ki
W (
φki
βφ¯ki θ
k
i
). (9)
Let ϕi be the common value of φ
1
i and φ
2
i , ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕI), and ϕ¯i =
∑
j πijϕj;
then the stage-1 market-clearing condition (6) becomes
Gi(ϕ, ǫ) ≡ W (
ϕi
βϕ¯iθ1i
) +W (
ϕi
βϕ¯iθ2i
)− 2βϕ¯i = 0. (10)
Again, when ǫ = 0, the system of equations Gi(ϕ, ǫ) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, has a unique
solution
ϕ(0) = (η, η, ..., η) ∈ RI
As described in the proof in the appendix, the relevant Jacobian matrix evaluated at
(ϕ, ǫ) = (ϕ(0), 0) is nonsingular provided that some mild regularity conditions hold.
Proposition 1 Let the ǫ-neighborhood of (1,1) that contains θi be sufficiently small.
Then under mild regularity conditions, there exists a unique stationary flexible exchange-
rate equilibrium and a unique stationary fixed-rate equilibrium which are in a neigh-
borhood of φ(0).
5Suppose the consumer has some assets after step-1 of the trading protocol. Any step-2 trade in
the protocol leaves the consumer indifferent between that trade and not trading. However, having
some assets and not trading is costly because the rate of return is less than 1/β.
This implies that the equilibrium is identical to that for a version in which consumers make
take-it-or-leave-it offers and are subject to country-specific cash-in-advance constraints.
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3.2 Nonequivalence
Fix ǫ > 0 and consider the two stationary equilibria in Proposition 1. We say that the
two equilibria are equivalent if they support the same stage-2 output in each state.
We focus on stage-2 output, because a welfare criterion that weights people equally at
the start of any period before the shocks are realized depends only on stage-2 output.
Now we show that the two equilibria are non equivalent. The main idea in the
proof which follows is that equality between the stage-2 outputs in the two exchange-
rate regimes requires that the two monies have the same expected rates-of-return
under flexible exchange rates. In the case of i.i.d. shocks, the expected values of
the two monies at the next stage 1 are equal and do not depend on the current
stage-1 shock. But, the current aggregate shock implies that the two monies have
different stage-1 values. Therefore, the expected rates of return cannot be equal. The
argument in the case of non i.i.d. shocks is similar, but a bit more complicated.
Proposition 2 The two equilibria in Proposition 1 are not equivalent unless there
are no aggregate shocks; i.e., unless (θki , θ
k
i ) = (1, 1) for all i.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that they are equivalent. Let state i be
the current aggregate state. Let δi be the (gross) one-period expected rate of return
on money in the Proposition-1 fixed-rate equilibrium. Let γ1i and γ
2
i be those rates
for monies 1 and 2, respectively, in the Proposition-1 flexible-rate equilibrium.
Under fixed rates, the problem in (7) stated in terms of real balances is
xki = argmax
x≥0
[−x+ θki U(βδix)] (11)
The analogous problem under flexible rates is
zki = argmax
z≥0
[−z + θki U(βγ
k
i z)] (12)
By (11), it follows that xki satisfies
1 = θki βδiU
′(βδix
k
i ). (13)
Therefore,
θ1i ≷ θ
2
i ⇔ x
1
i ≷ x
2
i . (14)
By (12), zki satisfies
1 = θki βγ
k
i U
′(βγki z
k
i ). (15)
By equivalence, we have δix
k
i = γ
k
i z
k
i . This, together with (13) and (15), implies
γ1i = γ
2
i = δi and x
k
i = z
k
i .
Without loss of generality, suppose that 2ıˆ = I and that θ1i > θ
2
i and σ(i) = ıˆ+ i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ ıˆ. By symmetry, (z1σ(i), z
2
σ(i)) = (z
2
i , z
1
i ). By the definition of equilibrium,
zki = φ
k
i . Therefore, γ
k
i =
∑I
j=1 πijz
k
j /z
k
i . It follows that
γ1i =
∑ıˆ
j=1
[πijz
1
j + πiσ(j)z
1
σ(j)]/z
1
i
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and
γ2i =
∑ıˆ
j=1
[πijz
2
j + πiσ(j)z
2
σ(j)]/z
2
i =
∑ıˆ
j=1
[πijz
1
σ(j) + πiσ(j)z
1
j ]/z
1
σ(i).
So by γ1i = γ
2
i ,∑ıˆ
j=1
[πijz
1
j + πiσ(j)z
1
σ(j)]/z
1
i =
∑ıˆ
j=1
[πijz
1
σ(j) + πiσ(j)z
1
j ]/z
1
σ(i).
Rearranging, we have∑ıˆ
j=1
πij[z
1
j z
1
σ(i) − z
1
σ(j)z
1
i ] =
∑ıˆ
j=1
πiσ(j)[z
1
j z
1
i − z
1
σ(j)z
1
σ(i)]. (16)
By (14), xki = z
k
i , and (z
1
σ(i), z
2
σ(i)) = (z
2
i , z
1
i ), the right-hand side of (16) is positive.
But the left-hand side of (16) is nonpositive when
i ∈ arg max
1≤j≤ıˆ
z1j /z
1
σ(j).
Hence, the two equilibria are not equivalent so long as there are aggregate shocks.
4 The speculative-fringe version
Now all current shocks are realized after the first market of stage-1 trade and before
the second stage-1 market at which only the currencies are traded in a competitive
market. We call the second stage-1 market a foreign-exchange market. In this version,
the equilibrium conditions are a set of simultaneous equations if and only if the
aggregate shock is serially correlated. Our formulation allows for serial correlation.
Let m and vi(m) be the same as in section 3, but let φi = (φ
1
i , φ
2
i ) be redefined
as the price vector of monies in terms of the stage-1 good on the first stage-1 market
when θi is the aggregate state of the previous period. In this notation, the presence
of the linear good in the first stage-1 market implies
vi(m) = β(A
′ + φim) (17)
for some constant A′. Consequently, Problem 1 can be adapted to this setting by
replacing φ¯i with φi. Let ei be the price of currency 2 in units of currency 1 on the
present foreign-exchange market when θi is the current realized aggregate state; let
e = (e1,e2, ..., eI). As in section 3, we use the normalization that the nominal exchange
rate; i.e., φ2i /φ
1
i and ei, is fixed at unity for all i under fixed rates.
Existence of equilibrium here requires not only φ¯ki /φ
k
i ≤ 1/β, but also φ
2
i /φ
1
i =
ei. The second condition eliminates the possibility of arbitrage gains for producers
between the current foreign-exchange market and the first stage-1 market of the next
period. It must hold in any equilibrium in which producers as a group leave the
foreign exchange market willing to hold both monies. In what follows, we restrict
attention to φ and e satisfying these two conditions.
Consider an agent who enters the foreign-exchange market with the portfolio m
when θj is the aggregate state of the present period. If the agent is a consumer who
consumes in country k, their problem is
wc,kj (m) = max
n≥(0,0)
[θkj u(y
k
j (n)) + vj(m− d
k
j (n))] (18)
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subject to n1 + ein2 = m1 + eim2, where (y
k
j (n), d
k
j (n)) is the trade determined by
Problem 1 when the consumer carries the portfolio n into a meeting. If the agent is
a producer, their problem is
wpj (m) = max
n≥(0,0)
vj(n) subject to n1 + ein2 = m1 + eim2. (19)
Here we use the fact that the producer gets zero surplus from meeting an on-path
consumer at stage 2.6 Therefore, in the first stage-1 market when θi is the aggregate
state of the last period, each agent from country-k chooses
mki = argmax
m≥0
{−mφi + 0.5
∑
j
πij[αw
c,k
j (m) + (1− α)w
c,−k
j (m) + w
p
j (m)]}, (20)
where α and 1−α are the agent’s probability of consuming at home and in the other
country, respectively, conditional on the agent being a consumer.
Under flexible exchange-rates, the first stage-1 market-clearing condition is
m1i = m
2
i = (0.5, 0.5) (21)
and the foreign-exchange market-clearing condition is
αnc,1j (m
1
i ) + (1− α)n
c,1
j (m
2
i )
4
+
αnc,2j (m
2
i ) + (1− α)n
c,2
j (m
1
i )
4
+
npj(mi)
2
= (1, 1), (22)
where npjl(m) is a solution to the problem in (19) and n
ck
j (m) is a solution to the
problem in (18). Under fixed rates, the stage-1 market-clearing condition is
2∑
k=1
2∑
l=1
mkil = 2 (23)
and the foreign-exchange market-clearing condition is
2∑
l=1
[
nc,1jl (mi)
4
+
nc,2jl (mi)
4
+
npjl(mi)
2
] = 2. (24)
Then, we have the following definition.
Definition 2 A pair of positive price vectors φ = {φi}
I
i=1 and e = {ei}
I
i=1 with
maxi,j(φ
k
i /φ
k
j ) < 1/β, k ∈ {1, 2}, is a stationary flexible exchange-rate equilibrium
if φ1i /φ
2
i = ei, (21) and (22) hold for all i and is a stationary fixed exchange-rate
equilibrium if φ1i /φ
2
i = ei = 1, (23) and (24) hold for all i.
The agent’s problem in (20) can be simplified to
max
m≥0
{−mφi + 0.5
∑
j
πij[αθ
k
jU(βmφj) + (1− α)θ
−k
j U(βmφj) + βmφj]}.
6This follows because the preference shocks are in a neighborhood of unity. This implies that in
any stationary equilibrium, all rates of return are close to unity. That implies that people acquire
money at the first-stage-1 market only because they may become consumers. And although they
face uncertainty about their preferences as consumers, that uncertainty is small enough to make
them choose an amount that implies that they leave the foreign exchange market only with the
favored money and that they offer all of it in the first step of the stage-2 trading protocol.
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Under fixed rates, this problem and the market-clearing condition (23) give rise to
ϕi = 0.5
∑
j
πijβϕj[αθ
k
jU
′(βϕj) + (1− α)θ
−k
j U
′(βϕj) + 1], (25)
where ϕi, as above, stands for the common value of φ
1
i = φ
2
i . Notice that (25)
defines a system of equations in ϕ. When ǫ = 0, the system has a unique solution
ϕ′ = (η′, η′, ..., η′) ∈ RI , where η′ is determined by
2 = β[U ′(βη′) + 1]. (26)
As is well known, setting the nominal exchange rate equal to unity under fixed
rates is a normalization. Indeed, under fixed rates, if φ2i /φ
1
i = ei = λ > 0, then the
equilibrium φi, denoted φi(λ), can be recovered from the relationship,
φ1i + φ
2
i = (1 + λ)φ
1
i = 2ϕi. (27)
The equilibria for different λ have the same real allocations in stages 1 and 2. Now,
however, if λ is sufficiently close to unity, then (φ, e) with φi = φi(λ) and ei = λ is a
flexible-rate equilibrium. The reason is that producers can and are willing to absorb
or support the extra supply or demand of any money on the part of consumers in the
foreign-exchange market. Therefore, we have the following existence result.
Proposition 3 Let the ǫ-neighborhood of (1,1) that contains θi be sufficiently small.
Then, under mild regularity conditions, there exists a unique stationary fixed exchange
-rate equilibrium such that the price vector φ is in a neighborhood of (ϕ′, ϕ′). In
addition, there exists a continuum of stationary flexible exchange-rate equilibria, each
of which has the price vector φ in the neighborhood of (ϕ′, ϕ′) and supports the same
real allocation as the fixed exchange -rate equilibrium.
The range of indeterminacy of the flexible exchange rate is easy to describe. It is
implied by the different possible equilibrium portfolios of producers after the foreign-
exchange market. The consumers who will consume in country-1 hold 1/4 of total
wealth measured in units of the stage-1 good, as do those who will consume in country
2. In equilibrium, each consumer uses the foreign-exchange market so that all their
wealth is in the form of the favored money. Producers hold half of wealth. Those
fractions of wealth do not depend on last period’s preference shock, which can affect
total wealth, but not those fractions. The fraction of producer wealth in the form
of country-1 money after the foreign-exchange market can range from zero to one.
Hence, as a fraction of total wealth of everyone after the foreign-exchange market,
holdings of country-1 money could range from 1/4 to 3/4. That implies that there
is a flexible exchange-rate equilibrium for any constant exchange rate in the interval
[1/3, 3].7
As is well-known, given a continuum of constant exchange-rate equilibria under
flexible exchange rates, it is easy to construct equilibria with random paths. One
example is a path with one-time uncertainty of the following sort. Let λ1, and λ2
7Bounds arise because all trades are spot quid pro quo trades; there are no short sales.
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with λ1 < λ2 be alternative constant equilibrium exchange-rates and let λ
′ = µλ1 +
(1 − µ)λ2 for any µ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for any fixed future date T , a path with λt = λ
′
for t < T and λt = λ1 for t ≥ T with probability µ and λt = λ2 for t ≥ T with
probability 1 − µ is also an equilibrium. In this model, all such equilibria have the
same real allocations because those who turn out to be producers are indifferent about
all portfolios of the two monies chosen in the foreign-exchange market of stage-1 that
have the same expected return. In a model in which stage-1 only has a foreign-
exchange market, a similar kind of multiplicity is also present, but holders of money
would not be indifferent among all portfolios with the same expected return and the
uncertainty would affect welfare.
5 A two-state i.i.d. example
Here is an example in which we have closed-form solutions for the equilibria for each
version of the model. There are two aggregate states: θ1 = (θ+, θ−), θ2 = (θ−, θ+)
where θ+ ≥ 1 ≥ θ− and (θ− + θ+)/2 = 1. Moreover, πij = 1/2 for all i, j.
5.1 The no-speculative fringe version
In this special case, the value of money under fixed exchange rates does not depend
on the state. (The easiest way to see this is to use the equivalence between fixed
exchange rates and a single money and to notice that the total demand for money
does not depend on the state in this two-state example.) Therefore, under fixed rates
the expected rate of return is constant at unity; i.e., δi = 1 in (11). Letting x
1
1 = x+
and x21 = x−, the fixed-rate equilibrium is given by
θ+βU
′(βx+) = θ−βU
′(βx−) = 1. (28)
It follows that βx+ > βx−; that is, output in the country with the high preference
shock is higher than that in the country with the low preference shock.
Under flexible exchange-rates, the equilibrium rates of return satisfy γki = 0.5(z
k
i +
z−ki )/z
k
i . Letting z
1
1 = z+ and z
2
1 = z−, the equilibrium conditions are
z+ = 0.5βθ+(z+ + z−)U
′[0.5β(z+ + z−)] (29)
and
z− = 0.5βθ−(z+ + z−)U
′[0.5β(z+ + z−)]. (30)
Summing (29) and (30), we have
1 = 0.5β(θ+ + θ−)U
′[0.5β(z+ + z−)]. (31)
Let z¯ = 0.5(z+ + z−). It follows from (31) that βU
′(βz¯) = 1 or that z¯ = η (where
βη is the output when there are no shocks). So z+ = θ+η and z− = θ−η. But, from
γki = 0.5(z
k
i + z
−k
i )/z
k
i , it follows that the rate of return in the country with the θ+
realization is 1/θ+ and that in the other country is 1/θ−. Therefore, output in each
country is always βη, which, as we have seen, does not happen under fixed rates.
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Although not a main focus of our analysis, this example lends itself to a simple
welfare analysis. Given that the welfare criterion assigns equal weights to people
entering stage-1, welfare depends only on stage-2 output and is proportional to the
expected value of [θu(y(θ)) − c(y(θ))], the expected value of the gains from trade
in stage-2 meetings. In this example under flexible exchange rates, that expected
value is u(βη)− c(βη). This is welfare under both regimes when there are no shocks.
Hence, the welfare comparison between the two regimes in this two-state example
comes down to the following. In a fixed exchange-rate regime (or one-money world),
would a person rather be born into the economy without aggregate preference shocks
or into the world with a mean preserving spread on the aggregate preference shocks.
If the former, then the flexible exchange-rate regime is better; if the latter, then the
fixed exchange-rate regime is better.
It follows that the welfare ranking of the two regimes in this example depends on
the curvature of the function,
H(θ) = [θu(y(θ))− c(y(θ))], (32)
where y(θ) = βx(θ) and x(θ) satisfies θβU ′(βx(θ)) = 1 (see (28)). If H is convex,
then fixed rates are better; if H is concave, then flexible rates are better.
In order to explore in some examples, let c(x) = x. Then W is the same as w
(i.e., the inverse of the function u′) and, by (28), y(θ) = βx(θ) = w( 1
βθ
) and
H(θ) = θu[w(
1
βθ
)]− w(
1
βθ
).
Suppose u(x) = 1− ae−x with a > 1/β. Then u′(x) = ae−x so w(x) = − ln(x/a) and
H(θ) = 1− θaeln(
1
aβθ
) + ln(
1
aβθ
) = 1−
1
β
− ln aβθ,
which is convex. (The function H is also convex in some others examples we tried:
u(x) = a ln(x + 1) with a > 1/β and u(x) = x1/2.) Therefore, for this example, the
fixed exchange-rate regime is better.
Not too much should be made of this finding because it depends on the example
and on every feature of the model, including the trading protocol which was chosen
to get imperfect substitutability between home and foreign currency in a simple way.
One reason the welfare analysis is complicated is because all the equilibria have stage-
2 outputs that are too low—outputs in the neighborhood of βη, where U ′(βη) = 1/β.
An optimum would require that outputs be in a neighborhood of y∗, where U ′(y∗) =
1.8
5.2 The speculative-fringe version
In this version, if the aggregate shock is i.i.d., then a stationary equilibrium under
fixed exchange rates is given by the solution to a single equation in one unknown. In
the two-state example, that equation, (25), is
x/4 = βx[αθ+U
′(βx)+ (1−α)θ−U
′(βx)+ 1]+βx[αθ−U
′(βx)+ (1−α)θ+U
′(βx)+ 1],
8For an analysis of trading protocols and their welfare consequences in the LW model, see Hu et.
al. [3] and Hu and Rocheteau [4].
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where x is the unit price of each money in terms of the stage-1 good. It follows that x
satisfies 1 = 0.5β[U(βx) + 1]. Therefore, x = η′, the unit price of money when there
is no aggregate uncertainty (see (26)). And, in this two-state example, welfare, the
expected value of [θu(y(θ))−c(y(θ))], is u(βη′)−c(βη′), which does not depend on how
much aggregate uncertainty there is. And, of course, all of these conclusions about
allocations hold for any one of the continuum of equilibria under flexible exchange
rates.
6 Centralized stage-2-trade with country-specific
cash-in-advance constraints
In order to convert our setting into one that is closer to Lucas [8], we here consider
the no speculative-fringe version, but with price-taking trade at stage-2 and with
country-specific cash-in advance (CIA) constraints. A quick way to show that this
does not produce equivalence is to note that if the c function, the function that
describes the stage-2 disutility of production, is linear, then the matching model and
this centralized version are identical. After all, the trading protocol we used in the
matching model leads consumers to hold only the favored money, the money that
satisfies the country-specific CIA constraint. And, although the trading protocol in
the matching model gives consumers monopsony power in meetings, that power is, of
course, ineffective if the c
function is linear. Although we could stop there, we want a more systematic ap-
proach in order to show that only a c function that converts stage-2 into an endowment
economy produces equivalence.
Here, let m, φi, and vi(m) be the same as in section 3. Now, however, those
objects are not sufficient to determine the stage-2 trades because individual decisions
at stage-2 also depend on the price in the stage-2 market. Let ψki denote the real value
of money k in the stage-2 spot market in country k and let ψi = {ψ
1
i , ψ
2
i }. As in the
matching models, existence of an equilibrium requires that following any realization
of the aggregate state, any asset has a gross expected return that does not exceed
1/β. Therefore, it is again without loss of generality to assume that producers choose
m = (0, 0) in the stage-1 market, a condition we impose as part of the definition of
equilibrium, and that consumers do not leave stage-2 with unspent money. Then the
stage-1 problem of a consumer who will consume in country-k at stage-2 is to choose
mki = arg max
mk≥0
[−mkφki + θ
k
i u(m
kψki )]. (33)
The stage-1 market-clearing condition is
(m1i ,m
2
i ) = (1, 1) (34)
under flexible exchange-rates and
m1i +m
2
i = 2, (35)
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under fixed rates. For the stage-2 market to clear in each country, we must also have
ψki c
′(mkiψ
k
i ) = βφ¯
k
i , (36)
the condition that equates the marginal cost of production to the relevant price.
Definition 3 A pair of positive price vectors φ = {φi}
I
i=1 and ψ = {ψi}
I
i=1 with
maxi,j(φ
k
i /φ
k
j ) ≤ 1/β, k ∈ {1, 2}, is a stationary flexible exchange-rate equilibrium
if (34) and (36) hold for all i and is a stationary fixed exchange-rate equilibrium if
φ1i = φ
2
i , (35) and (36) hold for all i.
Under flexible exchange rates, it follows from (33) and (34) that
φki = θ
k
i ψ
k
i u
′(ψki ). (37)
By (36) and (34), we have
ψki c
′(ψki ) = βφ¯
k
i . (38)
Equations (37) and (38) are a system of 4I equations in 4I unknowns, (φ, ψ). When
ǫ = 0, the solution is (φ, ψ) = (φ◦, ψ◦), where
φ◦ = ((ρu′(ρ), ρu′(ρ)), ..., (ρu′(ρ), ρu′(ρ))) ∈ R2I
and
ψ◦ = ((ρ, ρ), ..., (ρ, ρ)) ∈ R2I
with ρ = c−1(βη). (When ǫ = 0, (37) and (38) imply u′(x)/c′(x) = 1/β), which, by
the definition of η, implies that x = ρ.) Under fixed rates, let ϕi be the common
value of φ1i and φ
2
i . It follows from (33) that
ϕi = θ
k
i ψ
k
i u
′(mkiψ
k
i ), (39)
or
mkiψ
k
i = w(
ϕi
θki ψ
k
i
), (40)
where w is the inverse of u′. Substituting (40) into (35) and (36), we have
w(
ϕi
θ1iψ
1
i
)ψ2i + w(
ϕi
θ2iψ
2
i
)ψ1i = 2ψ
1
i ψ
2
i , (41)
and
ψki c
′(w(
ϕi
θki ψ
k
i
)) = βϕ¯i. (42)
Equations (41) and (42) are a system of 3I equations in 3I unknowns, (ϕ, ψ). When
ǫ = 0, the solution is (ϕ, ψ) = (ϕ◦, ψ◦), where (ϕ◦, ϕ◦) = φ◦.
Proposition 4 Let the ǫ-neighborhood of (1,1) that contains θi be sufficiently small.
Then, under mild regularity conditions, there exist a unique stationary flexible exchange-
rate equilibrium and a unique stationary fixed exchange-rate equilibrium that are in a
neighborhood of (φ◦, ψ◦).
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Now fix ǫ > 0 and consider the two equilibria in Proposition 4. As in section 4,
we say that the two equilibria are equivalent if they support the same stage-2 output
in each state.
Proposition 5 The two equilibria in Proposition 4 are not equivalent.
Proof. In this proof, we use tildes (∼) to denote objects in the flexible exchange-
rate equilibrium. In that equilibrium,
θki ψ˜
k
i u
′(ψ˜ki ) = φ˜
k
i (43)
and
ψ˜ki c
′(ψ˜ki ) = β
∑
j
πijφ˜
k
j . (44)
In the fixed exchange-rate equilibrium,
θki ψ
k
i u
′(mkiψ
k
i ) = ϕi (45)
and
ψki c
′(mkiψ
k
i ) = β
∑
j
πijϕj, (46)
where ϕi denotes the common value of φ
1
i and φ
2
i .
We first claim that the two equilibria are equivalent only if m1i = m
2
i = 1 in the
fixed exchange-rate equilibrium. Because the two equilibria are equivalent,
ψ˜ki = m
k
iψ
k
i . (47)
Then (47), (43) and (45) imply ψ˜ki /ψ
k
i = φ˜
k
i /ϕi. Using (47) again, this implies
φ˜ki = m
k
iϕi. (48)
By (44) and (47), mkiψ
k
i c
′(mkiψ
k
i ) = β
∑
j πijφ˜
k
j . This and (46) imply∑
j
πijφ˜
k
j = m
k
i
∑
j
πijϕi. (49)
Substituting (48) (which holds for all i) and into (49), we have
∑
j πijm
k
jφ
k
j =
mki
∑
j πijφ
k
j or ∑
j
πij(m
k
j −m
k
i )φ
k
j = 0. (50)
Notice that (49) can hold only if mki is constant in i. For, otherwise, (49) cannot hold
if i ∈ argmax1≤j≤I m
k
j . Because m
k
i +m
−k
i = 2 all i, it follows that m
1
i = m
2
i = 1.
Now, suppose by contradiction that the two equilibria are equivalent. By the
above claim, m1i = m
2
i = 1. So by (45),
θ1i ≷ θ
2
i ⇔ ψ
1
i ≷ ψ
2
i .
But by (46), ψ1i = ψ
2
i , a contradiction.
Why, then, is there a presumption that flexible prices implies equivalence between
the two exchange-rate regimes? We suspect that it arises from the use of models in
which nothing real depends on the rates of return of the two monies. In our model,
consumers are not directly affected by the future exchange rate because they spend all
their money holdings in current transactions. However, producers are directly affected
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because they carry money into the next period. Therefore, flexibility of prices is not
sufficient to maintain the optimizing conditions for both consumers and producers.
That is, if we let the current real exchange rates be the same in the two regimes
in order to obtain the same consumption, then the expected future exchange rates
cannot be arranged to satisfy the conditions for the choice of production. Indeed,
this is how the contradiction is derived in the proof of Proposition 5.9
We could get equivalence by adopting a special case of our model that eliminates
the influence of future exchange rates on the producer’s stage-2 decision. The spec-
ification is c(y) = 0 for y ∈ [0, ω] and c(y) = ∞ for y > ω, which, eliminates any
decision by producers.10 In this specification, (42) is no longer an equilibrium condi-
tion and consumption is ω, the endowment of producers. Then, we can equate ψ˜ki in
(43) to ψki in (45) and set φ˜
k
i equal to ϕi. Of course, if we adopt this form for c, then
we convert the model into a classical-dichotomy model because we fix exogenously
the consumptions that determine welfare.
7 Concluding remarks
Our models are special in at least three respects. First, there is no direct substitutabil-
ity between home and foreign goods. Such substitutability could be introduced by
letting the heterogeneous shock that determines tourism status be less extreme. In-
stead of directly determining tourism status, it could determine a degree of relative
preference between home and foreign goods. Then, tourist status would be endoge-
nous and would interact with returns on the two monies under flexible exchange
rates.
Second, in our model all trade is spot quid pro quo trade for money. Such trade
is rationalized by assuming an extreme version of imperfect monitoring; namely, that
the past actions of each person are private information to the person. If we want a
model in which spot trade for money is essential, then some imperfect monitoring is
necessary, but it need not be so extreme.11
Third, our trading protocol produces an extreme version of imperfect substi-
tutability between monies: all trades of money for goods involve only the home
money of the producers. For the no-speculative-fringe version, we are confident that
there are trading protocols that produce trades in the pairwise core and give rise to a
9What happens if we drop the country-specific CIA constraints in this model of centralized trade?
That depends on what we put in its place. We would favor having the monies be perfect substitutes
at the exchange rate in the next stage-1 market. If so, then under flexible exchange rates there is
exchange-rate indeterminacy of the kind displayed in Kareken and Wallace [5].
10This kind of producer is just like the worker from the shopper-worker family who sells the family
endowment in Lucas [8]. In this case, our optimizing conditions for consumers imply a condition
that resembles the condition in Lucas [8] on the marginal rate of substitution for his representative
consumer.
11See Araujo and Hu [1] for an analysis of credit in a version of the LW model.
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less extreme version of imperfect substitutability—one in which some trades involve
the money that is not the home money of the producer. However, we decided that
the benefit of achieving a less extreme pattern of transactions was more than offset
by the added complexity of using such protocols.
In any case, we suspect that our results will survive various generalizations in
those and other directions. The results are negative in the sense that they show
nonequivalence between the sets of equilibria under fixed and flexible exchange-rate
regimes. Because they are negative in that sense, it is unlikely that generalizations
of the model will overturn them.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let B = β[U ′(βη) + βηU ′′(βη)] and assume that the following regularity condition
holds:
Condition 1 (πiiB − 1)(πjjB − 1) 6= πijπjiB
2, all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ I.
The partial derivative of F ki (.) with respect to φ
k
j is
βπijθ
k
i [U
′(βφ¯ki ) + βφ¯
k
iU
′′(βφ¯ki )]
if j 6= i and is
βπiiθ
k
i [U
′(βφ¯ki ) + βφ¯
k
iU
′′(βφ¯ki )]− 1
if j = i. Evaluated at (φ, ǫ) = (φ(0), 0), this derivative is πijB if j 6= i and πiiB − 1
if j = i. Therefore, the Jacobian matrix composed of the partial derivatives of
(F k1 (.), F
k
2 (.), ..., F
k
I (.)) with respect to (φ
k
1, .., φ
k
I ), evaluated at (φ, ǫ) = (φ(0), 0), is
BΠ− I, (51)
where Π ≡ [πij] is the transition matrix of aggregate states and I is the I× I identity
matrix. The partial derivative of Gi(.) with respect to ϕj is
ϕiπij
β(ϕ¯i)2θ1i
W ′(
ϕi
βϕ¯iθ1i
) +
ϕiπij
β(ϕ¯i)2θ2i
W ′(
ϕi
βϕ¯iθ2i
)− 2βπij
if j 6= i and
ϕiπij + ϕ¯i
β(ϕ¯i)2θ1i
W ′(
ϕi
βϕ¯iθ1i
) +
ϕiπij + ϕ¯i
β(ϕ¯i)2θ2i
W ′(
ϕi
βϕ¯iθ2i
)− 2βπii
if j = i, where, as in the text, W is the inverse of U ′. Evaluated at (ϕ, ǫ) = (ϕ(0), 0),
this derivative is πij2[
1
βη
W ′( 1
β
) − β] if j 6= i and πii2[
1
βη
W ′( 1
β
) − β] + 2 1
βη
W ′( 1
β
) if
j = i. Therefore, because W ′( 1
β
)U ′′(βη) = 1 and βU ′(βη) = 1, the Jacobian matrix
composed of the partial derivatives of (G1(.), G2(.), ..., GI(.)), with respect to ϕ is also
BΠ− I.
If B = 0 then B · Π − Id is invertible. So suppose B 6= 0 and consider the ith
and jth columns of B · Π − Id with j > i. If either πiiB − 1 = 0 or πj,jB − 1 =
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0, then these two columns are obviously linearly independent. So, suppose that
(πiiB − 1)(πjjB − 1) 6= 0. It suffices to show that the ith and jth rows of these two
columns are linearly independent or that[
πiiB − 1 πijB
πjiB πjjB − 1
]
is invertible. This is ensured by condition 1. Hence, BΠ − I is invertible and the
proposition follows from the implicit function theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let B′ = 0.5β[U ′(βη′) + βη′U ′′(βη′) + 1] and assume that the following regularity
condition holds:
Condition 2 (πiiB
′ − 1)(πjjB
′ − 1) 6= πijπjiB
′B′, all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ I.
Referring to (25), let
G¯i(ϕ, ǫ) = 0.5
∑
j
πijβϕj[αθ
k
jU
′(βϕj) + (1− α)θ
−k
j U
′(βϕj) + 1]− ϕi.
Notice that G¯i(η
′, 0) = 0. Let
χij = 0.5πijβ[αθ
k
jU
′(βϕj) + (1− α)θ
−k
j U
′(βϕj) + 1]
+0.5πijβ
2ϕj[αθ
k
jU
′′(βϕj) + (1− α)θ
−k
j U
′(βϕj)].
The partial derivative of G¯i(.) with respect to ϕj is χij if j 6= i and is 1 + χii if j = i.
The Jacobian matrix composed of the partial derivatives of (G¯1(.), G¯2(.), ..., G¯i(.)) with
respect to (ϕ1, .., ϕI), evaluated at (ϕ, ǫ) = (η
′, 0), is B′Π− I, where Π and I are the
same as in (51). By the argument in the proof of Proposition 1, Condition 2 implies
that B′Π− I is invertible. Therefore, the implicit function theorem applies.
Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that ρ = c−1(βη) where η satisfies βU ′(βη) = 1, and that w is the inverse of
u. Let C0 = c
′′(w(u′(ρ)))w′(u′(ρ)) and C1 = c
′(w(u′(ρ)))− u′(ρ)C0. We assume that
the following regularity conditions hold:
Condition 3 [c′(ρ) + ρc′′(ρ)] 6= βπii[u
′(ρ) + ρu′′(ρ)], all i;
Condition 4 C1 6= 0.
Referring to (37) and (38), let Fˆ ki (φ, ψ, ǫ) = (Fˆ
k,0
i (φ, ψ, ǫ), Fˆ
k,1
i (φ, ψ, ǫ)) be defined
by
Fˆ k,0i (φ, ψ, ǫ) = φ
k
i − θ
k
i ψ
k
i u
′(ψki ),
Fˆ k,1i (φ, ψ, ǫ) = ψ
k
i c
′(ψki )− βφ¯
k
i .
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Notice that Fˆ ki (φ
◦, ψ◦, 0) = (0, 0). The partial derivative of Fˆ k,0i (.) with respect to
φkj is zero if j 6= i and is one if j = i. The partial derivative of Fˆ
k,1
i (.) with respect to
φkj is −βπij. The partial derivative of Fˆ
k,0
i (.) with respect to ψ
k
j is zero if j 6= i and is
−θki [u
′(ψki )+ψ
k
i u
′′(ψki )] if j = i. The partial derivative of Fˆ
k,1
i (.) with respect to ψ
k
j is
zero if j 6= i and is c′(ψki ) + ψ
k
i c
′′(ψki ) if j = i. Hence, the Jacobian matrix composed
of the partial derivatives of (Fˆ k1 (.), Fˆ
k
2 (.), ..., Fˆ
k
I ) with respect to (φ, ψ), evaluated at
(φ, ψ, ǫ) = (φ◦, ψ◦, 0) is 

I
... −[u′(ρ) + ρu′′(ρ)]I
· · · · · · · · ·
−βΠ
... [c′(ρ) + ρc′′(ρ)]I

 , (52)
whereΠ and I are the same as in (51). By its structure, the matrix in (52) is invertible
if its ith and (i + I)th columns are linearly independent for 1 ≤ i ≤ I. This is the
case if the ith and (i+1)th rows of these two columns constitute an invertible matrix.
That, in turn, follows from Condition 3.
Referring to (41) and (42), let Gˆi(ϕ, ψ, ǫ) = (Gˆ
0
i (ϕ, ψ, ǫ), Gˆ
1
i (ϕ, ψ, ǫ), Gˆ
2
i (ϕ, ψ, ǫ))
be defined by
Gˆ0i (ϕ, ψ, ǫ) = w(
ϕi
θ1iψ
1
i
)ψ2i + w(
ϕi
θ2iψ
2
i
)ψ1i − 2ψ
1
i ψ
2
i ,
Gˆ1i (ϕ, ψ, ǫ) = ψ
1
i c
′(w(
ϕi
θ1iψ
1
i
))− βϕ¯i,
Gˆ2i (ϕ, ψ, ǫ) = ψ
2
i c
′(w(
ϕi
θ2iψ
2
i
))− βϕ¯i.
Notice that Gˆi(ϕ
◦, ψ◦, 0) = (0, 0, 0). The partial derivative of Gˆ0i (.) with respect to
ϕi is zero if j 6= i and is w
′( ϕi
θ1i ψ
1
i
)
ψ2i
θ1i ψ
1
i
+ w′( ϕi
θ2i ψ
2
i
)
ψ1i
θ2i ψ
2
i
if j = i. The partial derivative
of Gˆki (.) with respect to ϕi is −βπij if j 6= i and is
ψki
θki ψ
k
i
c′′(w( ϕi
θki ψ
k
i
))w′( ϕi
θki ψ
k
i
) − βπii
if j = i for k = 1, 2. The partial derivative of Gˆ0i (.) with respect to ψ
1
j is zero
if j 6= i and is −w′( ϕi
θ1i ψ
1
i
)
ψ2i
θ1i (ψ
1
i )
2
+ w( ϕi
θ2i ψ
2
i
) − 2ψ2i if j = i. The partial derivative
of Gˆ0i (.) with respect to ψ
2
j is zero if j 6= i and is w(
ϕi
θ1i ψ
1
i
) − w′( ϕi
θ2i ψ
2
i
)
ψ1i
θ2i (ψ
2
i )
2
− 2ψ1i
if j = i. The partial derivative of Gˆki (.) with respect to ψ
k
j is zero if j 6= i and
is c′(w( ϕi
θki ψ
k
i
)) −
ϕiψ
k
i
θki (ψ
k
i )
2
c′′(w( ϕi
θki ψ
k
i
))w′( ϕi
θki ψ
k
i
) if j = i; and the partial derivative of
Gˆki (.) with respect to ψ
−k
j is zero. Hence, the Jacobian matrix composed of the partial
derivatives of (Gˆ1(.), Gˆ2(.), ..., GˆI(.)) with respect to (ϕ, ψ), evaluated at (ϕ, ψ, ǫ) =
(ϕ◦, ψ◦, 0) is 

2w′(u′(ρ))I
... C2I
... C2I
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
−βΠ+ C0I
... C1I
... 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
−βΠ+ C0I
... 0
... C1I


, (53)
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where Π and I are the same as in (51), C2 = −w
′(u′(ρ))/ρ + w(u′(ρ)) − 2ρ, and 0
is the I × I zero matrix. By Condition 4, the matrix in (53) is invertible if its ith,
(i + I)th, and (i + 2I)th columns are linearly independent for 1 ≤ i ≤ I, which is
clearly the case.
Therefore, we obtain the proposition from the implicit function theorem.
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